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Abstract: Determining what should be considered a material item has 
been a problem for both the accounting profession and the courts. By 
reviewing the court cases involving the issue of materiality, the au-
thors have determined where differences in the materiality standard 
as applied by the courts exist. The judicial definition of materiality has 
developed over time, and current trends with important variations are 
observed. Based upon the authors' analysis, the following judicial defi-
nition of materiality, with its possible variations, is suggested: Would 
the reasonable (or speculative) investor (or layman) consider impor-
tant (or be influenced by) this information in determining his course 
of action? 
Finding a general definition for materiality has been difficult 
for both the accounting profession and the courts of the United 
States. The courts have been criticized for not developing a con-
cise definition of materiality. [Reckers, et. al., 1985; Jeffries, 1981]. 
However, the accounting profession itself has not been able to 
precisely define what is or is not material. Without an all-purpose 
definition of materiality, the courts have grappled with its mean-
ing on a case-by-case basis. The result has been confusion over 
some elements of the definition. This paper will review the cases 
involving materiality and the evolution of the definition of materi-
ality in the courts. Based upon an analysis of the court opinions, 
the varying standards which have been applied by the courts will 
be explained. 
THE ACCOUNTANTS VIEW OF MATERIALITY 
Accountants have recognized that the profession would ben-
efit if a general definition of materiality could be developed. In 
1973, the issue of materiality was one of the original items for 
consideration by the newly-formed Financial Accounting Stan-
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dards Board (FASB). The Board's conclusions on materiality crite-
ria were issued in 1980 in its Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concepts (SFAC) No. 2, "Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information." The FASB announced that it would not attempt to 
codify basic rules for materiality, stating, "The Board's present 
position is that no general standards of materiality can be formu-
lated to take into account all the considerations that enter into an 
experienced human judgment" [FASB, 1980, p. xiii]. The Board 
instead issued this general definition of materiality: 
The magnitude of an omission or misstatement of ac-
counting information that, in the light of surrounding 
circumstances, makes it probable that the judgment of a 
reasonable person relying on the information would have 
been changed or influenced by the omission or misstate-
ment [FASB, 1980, p. xv]. 
Even though the FASB gives a subjective definition, accoun-
tants tend to quantify the concept of materiality. According to 
SFAC No. 2, "Materiality judgments are primarily quantitative in 
nature. They pose the question: Is this item large enough for users 
of the information to be influenced by it?" Research has estab-
lished that most accountants view materiality in terms of net in-
come, usually 5 to 10 percent [Pattillo and Siebel, 1974; Slipp, 
1983]. 
Objective accounting standards for material items have been 
established for a few limited issues. For example, Accounting Prin-
ciples Board Opinion (APB) No. 15 states that a reduction in earn-
ings per share of less than three percent will not be material, such 
that the computation of diluted earnings per share will not be 
required. 
MATERIALITY IN THE COURTS 
If accountants have had difficulty in formulating a general 
definition for materiality, it should not be surprising that the 
courts of the United States have applied varying standards for 
materiality. Like the profession, the courts have been required to 
determine what is material in each situation that is brought before 
a tribunal. 
Common Law 
The application of a legal standard of materiality to accoun-
tants is drawn from the common law of torts. Accountants have 
been sued for supplying misleading information under the com-
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mon law remedies for misrepresentation and fraud. The Restate-
ment of Torts 2d (1988) defines materiality in cases of fraudulent 
misrepresentation as follows: 
§ 538(2) The matter is material if (a) a reasonable man 
would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence 
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in 
question; or (b) the maker of the representation knows or 
has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely 
to regard the matter as important in determining his 
choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so 
regard it. 
Comments to this section of the Restatement provide that the 
materiality decision is a question of fact which is a "matter of 
judgment." Like the accounting profession, the common law rec-
ognizes that materiality must be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. An item is material under common law if "a reasonable man 
would have regarded the fact misrepresented to be important in 
determining his course of action" [Restatement § 538, Comment 
(e)]. 
Securities Laws 
The Security Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 created crimi-
nal and civil liability for certain actions and omissions. The Acts 
use the term "material" to describe the offenses involving mislead-
ing information, but never define what is material. Security regu-
lations have attempted to give some guidance, stating 
The term 'material' when used to qualify a requirement 
for the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits 
the information required to those matters which an aver-
age prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed 
before purchasing the security registered [17 C.F.R. 
§230.405(1) and 240.12b-2, 1984]. 
It is under the securities acts that the courts have most often 
been asked to interpret the materiality of financial information. 
The courts' definition of materiality has varied depending upon 
the particular statute or regulation involved and the facts of each 
case. 
Evolution of Materiality in Case Law 
Cases in which materiality has been an issue fall into three 
main categories, (1) trading on insider information, (2) omissions 
from financial or registration statements, and (3) omissions from 
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proxy materials. While not all of these cases have involved accoun-
tants, each has contributed to the definition of materiality in the 
courts. 
Insider Trading. An early case involving trading on insider in-
formation is Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., [73 F.Supp. 798 
(E.D.Pa. 1947)]. In this case, a corporation was owned equally by 
four shareholders, two of whom served as officers. The two offic-
ers purchased the stock holdings of the other two shareholders 
without informing them that negotiations for the sale of the com-
pany had begun. Whether the pending sale was a material fact was 
an important issue in the case. The court stated that information 
was material if it would "affect the judgment of the other party to 
the transaction." 
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., [340 F.2d 457 (Cir. 2, 1965), cert, 
den. 382 U.S. 811], involved a similar insider trading allegation, 
with insiders purchasing the shares of a minority shareholder af-
ter information concerning a possible sale of the corporation be-
came available. The court further developed the definition of ma-
teriality, stating, 
The proper test is whether the plaintiff would have been 
influenced to act differently than he did act if the defen-
dant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact. To put 
the matter conversely, insiders 'are not required to search 
out details that presumably would not influence the 
person's judgment with whom they are dealing.' Kohler v. 
Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (Cir. 7, 1963). 
Financial or registration statements. Accountants are most of-
ten defendants in cases which involve omissions from financial 
statements. An important case in this area is Escott v. Barchris 
Construction Corp., [283 F.Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)]. In this 
case, a number of items were found to have been misstated in the 
financial statements of the corporation. These items included an 
overstatement of sales and income, an understatement of liabili-
ties, and the omission of information concerning officer loans and 
delinquent customer accounts. In a controversial decision, the 
court found that some of the omissions were material, while oth-
ers of similar magnitude were not. Overstatement of earnings per 
share by about 15% was found not be material. At the same time, 
balance sheet errors which resulted in a current ration of 1.9:1, 
which if correctly stated would have been 1.6:1 were held to be 
material.1 In making the materiality determination, the court de-
1For a critical discussion of the result see Briloff (1972), pp. 53-54. 
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fined "materiality" as those matters which 
an investor needs to know before he can make an intelli-
gent, informed decision The average prudent investor 
is not concerned with minor inaccuracies or with errors 
as to matters which are not of interest to him. The facts 
which tend to deter him from purchasing a security are 
facts which have an important bearing upon the nature 
or condition of the issuing corporation or its business. 
Proxy Statements. The Supreme Court of the United States has 
most often considered materiality under the Securities Acts in de-
termining the validity of proxy solicitations. Important ex-
amples of the Supreme Court decisions involving proxies include: 
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, [377 U.S. 426 (1964)]; Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., [396 U.S. 375 (1970)]; TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc., [426 U.S. 438 (1976)]. The facts of these proxy cases are 
similar, with a proposed corporate merger or acquisition as the 
subject of the controversy. In the Mills case, the Supreme Court, in 
dicta, made the following statement defining materiality: 
Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy state-
ment has been shown to be 'material,' as it was found to 
be here, that determination itself indubitably embodies a 
conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it 
might have been considered important by a reasonable 
shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to 
vote [Emphasis added.] [396 U.S. 375, 384.] 
This statement caused confusion in the lower courts when apply-
ing the materiality standard.2 In TSC Industries v. Northway, the 
Supreme Court clarified the definition of materiality in proxy 
statement cases. The standard of disclosure is not those items 
which might be considered important to a shareholder. Instead, 
the Supreme Court defined materiality under this securities regu-
lation as follows: 
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it im-
portant in deciding how to vote. . . . It does not require 
proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the 
omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor 
to change his vote [Emphasis added.] [426 U.S. 406, 409.] 
2In Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 597 (Cir. 5, 1974), the lower 
court discusses the problems with the Mills definition. 
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JUDICIAL DEFINITION OF MATERIALITY 
There remain differences in the definition of materiality as 
applied by the courts. These differences can be summarized as 
follows: 
1) Would the information have actually influenced the actions 
of another or would the information only be considered 
important to another? 
2) Who must be affected by the error or omission, the average 
investor or the reasonable layman? 
3) Who must be affected by the error or omission, the prudent 
investor or the speculative investor? 
In Table 1, the variations in the elements of the definition, as 
interpreted by the courts in selected cases, are presented. 
An analysis of past court cases reveals that these differences 
depend, for the most part, on the subject matter of the litigation 
and the particular section or regulation under the securities laws 
involved. However, trends which have developed over time can 
also be seen. 
Analysis of the Court-Derived Materiality Standard 
"Influence" or "Important". In determining the standard for 
materiality decisions, the courts have sometimes required that ma-
terial information be significant enough that it would affect the 
decision of the recipient of the information. Examples of these 
cases include Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., supra; Kohler v. 
Kohler Co., supra; List v. Fashion Park, supra; Crane Co. v. 
Westinghouse Air Brake Company, [419 F.2d 787 (Cir. 2, 1969)]. 
In other cases, information has been held to be material if it 
were important to the recipient in making his decision, regardless 
of whether it would have caused him to act differently. Examples 
of these cases include SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur, [401 F.2d 833 (Cir. 
2, 1967), cert. den. 394 U.S. 976]; Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. 
United States, [406 U.S. 89 (1972)], Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 
supra; TSC Industries v. Northway, supra. This "important" thresh-
old test requires that additional information be revealed and places 
a higher standard on accountants. While some controversy has 
existed over whether information which "might" be considered 
important or which "would" be considered important should be 
revealed, the Supreme Court clarified the standard in TSC Indus-
tries v. Northway. In that case, the Court declared that only the 
information which would be considered important should be re-
quired. 
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Table 1 
Opinions on the Elements of Materiality 
Accounting Profession 
SFAC No. 2 
Common Law 
Restatement of Torts 
Court Cases Under 
Securities Laws* 
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 
Cir. 7, 1963 (131) 
List v. Fashion Park, 
Cir. 2, 1965 (266) 
Escott v. Barchris 
Construction Corp., 
S.D.N.Y., 1968 (61) 
SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur, S.Ct., 
1968 (565) 
Mills v. Electric 
Auto-Lite, S.Ct., 
1970 (827) 
Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Cir. 2, 
1973 (143) 
Smallwood v. Pearl 
Brewing Co., 
Cir. 5, 1974 (147) 
TSC Industries v. 
Northway, S.Ct., 
1976 (597) 
"Influence" 
v. 
"Important" 
Influence 
or Important 
Important 
Influence 
Influence 
Influence 
Important 
Important 
Influence 
Important 
Important 
"Layman" 
v. 
"Investor" 
Layman 
Layman 
Layman 
Layman 
Investor 
Investor 
Investor 
Investor 
Layman 
Investor 
"Speculative" 
v. 
"Prudent" 
Prudent 
Prudent 
Prudent 
Prudent 
Prudent 
Speculative 
Prudent 
Prudent 
Prudent 
Prudent 
* This list of cases is not intended to be inclusive, but to provide a representative 
sample only. The number in parenthesis indicates the number of cases which 
have cited each case, as determined by LEXIS search. These high numbers of 
citations are indicative of the importance of these cases. 
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Table 1, which summarizes the positions of the courts, reveals 
a trend over time. The courts appear to be moving away from the 
standard that information must influence another's actions in or-
der to be material. Instead, the more recent decisions have re-
quired that any important information be considered material. 
While this places a higher burden on the accounting profession, at 
least the Supreme Court has refused to apply an even higher stan-
dard which would require disclosure of all information which 
might be considered important.3 
"Investor" or "Layman". The common law standard for mis-
representation is that of the hypothetical "reasonable man." This 
standard has sometimes been adopted by the courts in applying 
the definition of materiality to financial information.4 As stated by 
the court in Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 
. . . the test of materiality is 'whether a reasonable man 
would attach importance to the fact misrepresented in 
determining his course of action.' This definition, born of 
the Restatement of Torts, § 538(2)(a), has a rich history of 
application to the securities laws. [Citations omitted.] It 
has not been and should not be discarded as a standard. 
[489 F.2d 579, 604 (Cir. 5, 1974), cert. den. 419 U.S. 873]. 
The courts have also applied the standard of the "average 
prudent investor." Under this standard, the user of financial infor-
mation can be assumed to have some basic knowledge of invest-
ment activities.5 Whether this is a higher or lower standard than 
that of the "reasonable man" depends on the facts. In some situa-
tions, a layman might require a more thorough explanation of the 
activities of a company. At other times, a knowledgeable investor 
might demand that more information be disseminated. 
Again, a trend over time appears to have developed under the 
securities laws. Recent cases tend to apply the standard of the 
"average prudent investor." 
"Prudent" or "Speculative". In some special situations, an even 
higher standard of materiality may be required. In SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co., supra, the materiality of reports on mining ex-
plorations which were not disclosed to the public prior to in-
3Note that the Supreme Court cases which have recently ruled in the area of 
materiality have all considered misinformation or omissions in proxy statements 
under Rule 14a-9 of the securities regulations. It is possible that a different 
standard could apply if another topic were considered. 
4For a discussion of the layman and the securities acts, see Kripke (1973). 
5Jennings, et. al. (1985) discuss this difference in the application of the rule. 
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sider purchases was in dispute. Relying upon the legislative history 
of the securities acts, the court stated that this information "would 
certainly have been an important fact to a reasonable, if specula-
tive, investor in deciding whether he should buy, sell, or hold." 
[401 F.2d 833, 850 (1968)]. 
While the definition of materiality applied by the court in 
Texas Gulf Sulphur is unusual, it should not be ignored.6 Because 
materiality decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, all the facts 
and circumstances of a company must be considered. As stated by 
the court, 
whether facts are material . . . will depend at any given 
time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability 
that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of 
the event in light of the totality of the company activity. 
[401 F.2d 833, 849(1968)]. 
Summary of the Judicial Definition of Materiality 
From an analysis of judicial decisions, the best general defini-
tion of materiality which can be developed is that items will be 
material if the average prudent investor would consider the infor-
mation important in evaluating his course of action. However, 
variations of this definition can occur, depending on the facts and 
circumstances of each case and the issue involved. Accountants 
should keep in mind these possible variations of the materiality 
standard in the courts. Taking these less often applied variations 
into consideration, the judicial test for materiality is better stated 
as follows: Would the average reasonable [or speculative] investor 
[or layman] consider important [or be influenced by] this informa-
tion in determining his course of action. 
CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS 
The accounting profession and the judicial system have had 
difficulty in formulating a general definition of materiality. Both 
recognize that decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis. 
However, accountants and the courts approach the problem differ-
ently. Accountants tend to evaluate information quantitatively. De-
cisions as to materiality are made in terms of the comparative 
magnitude of the information. The courts apply a qualitative stan-
6For a critical discussion of the result, see Kripke (1971). 
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dard, looking at the use of the information by the readers of finan-
cial statements. For the courts, the magnitude of the item may be 
one factor to consider in determining materiality, but it is not a 
controlling factor. 
Accountants may be unsettled by what appears to be a lack of 
uniformity in the courts when defining materiality. However, the 
U.S. judicial system causes some of the differences evident in the 
court cases. When courts in various jurisdictions are approached 
to determine issues of materiality, different precedents are set. 
Only the standards set in the decisions of the Supreme Court are 
applied universally. Another factor which creates differences in 
court cases is that materiality has been an issue in many types of 
cases. In making materiality determinations, the courts have scru-
tinized various statutes and regulations within the body of the 
securities laws. This paper has concentrated on the definition of 
materiality in the courts and has not investigated the varying nu-
ances evident in different sections of the securities act and regula-
tions. Thus, the problem with the varying standards of materiality 
may lie within the regulations and not with the evaluation by the 
courts. 
Because materiality is determined based upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case, differences in its application can be 
expected to continue. The courts might be more likely to apply a 
universal standard if the accounting profession could first develop 
a specific definition to be applied. As stated by the court in U.S. v. 
Simon, [425 F.2d 796, 807 (Cir. 2, 1969)]: 
We do not think the jury was also required to accept the 
accountants' evaluation whether a given fact was mate-
rial, at least not when the accountants' testimony was not 
based on specific rules or prohibitions to which they 
could point, but only on the need for the auditor to make 
an honest judgment... [Emphasis added.] 
As long materiality decisions are made on a case-by-case basis 
under different common and statutory law standards, differences 
in the application of the rule by the courts will continue. 
Even though the accounting profession has developed its own 
view of materiality, the judicial definition cannot be ignored. In 
today's litigious society, if an accountant's judgment is questioned, 
the ultimate determination of proper treatment is often made by 
the courts. To avoid legal liability, accountants must comply with 
the common law definition of materiality as it has evolved. There-
fore, accountants are compelled to adopt the judicial definition of 
10
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materiality, though it may not always agree with the profession's 
conceptual framework of accounting. 
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